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NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant Mark A, Schoenfeld appeals from the
verdict of guilty to a lesser included charge of negligent homicide by jury verdict on a trial for manslaughter
before the Honorable Bryant H. Croft in the District Court
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

He was sentenced

by Judge Croft to one year in the County Jail,
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks to have the verdict reversed
and the case remanded for new trial on the negligent homicide charge only,
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant was charged with criminal homircide, a felony in the second degree (manslaughter),
alleging:
"That on or about the 29th day of July,
1974, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
the defendant Mark Allen Schoenfeld recklessly or under circumstances not legally
justifiable or excusable caused the death
of James Ivan Versluis.11 (R 13)
The charge was under 76-5-205, Utah Code Annotated, as
amended, after being reduced at preliminary hearing from
a charge of murder in the second degree.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

On July 19, 1974, there were two,beer parties
at The Spruces in Big Cottonwood Canyon.

Both the appel-

lant Schoenfeld and the deceased Versluis were in attendance but were not acquainted at the time.

Schoenfeld's

friend and roommate, Austin, was involved in two fights at
The Spruces.

These fights were broken up and Austin took

his car and left the canyon, leaving Schoenfeld afoot.
Schoenfeld rode down the canyon with Dee Johnson, who,
enroute, asked Schoenfeld to perform fellatio on himf
Schoenfeld refused and became very upset.

After arriving

at the Canyon Inn at the mouth of Big Cottonwood Canyon,
Schoenfeld and Johnson had further words, and Schoenfeld
left.
Austin had gone down to the south part of
Salt Lake valley and had picked up one Guthrie, a mutual
friend of Austin and Schoenfeld, and had procured a .22
semi automatic pistol belonging to Schoenfeld and had
gone back to The Spruces in Guthrie's car with Guthrie
driving.

Finding the party had terminated, they came

back down the canyon.

While enroute Austin fired the

gun once into the hillside.

They picked up Schoenfeld,

who was hitchhiking on 70th South.

Schoenfeld told them

about being propositioned, and indicated he wanted to
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go back and fight "that queer."

Austin informed Schoenfeld

he had the gun and gave it to Schoenfeld, who put it under
his belt in back and pulled his shirt over it.
went back to the Canyon Inn,

The three

Schoenfeld walked to the

middle of the parking lot and indicated to Johnson that
he wanted to fight. Johnson walked out towards Schoenfeld
and they both continued north to the roadf with Schoenfeld
backing and Johnson walking forward.
In the meantimer the deceased Versluis had knocked
both Austin and Guthrie down and had chased Austin out of
the parking lot to 70th South and west along 70th South.
Schoenfeld had left Johnson with no physical contact between
the two, and was backing south towards Guthrie's car, which
Guthrie had already entered, when Versluis, who was 6'3" tall
and 225 lbs. (R 125) , came running rapidly towards Schoenfeld,
swinging a belt with a buckle attached over his head.

Up

to this time there had been no contact between Schoenfeld
and Versluis, either physical or verbal.
At this point the testimony varies, some witnesses
saying Schoenfeld said "I've got a gun and I am not fooling."
Other witnesses, including Ehrler, saying Ehrler shouted
"He's got a gun."

Schoenfeld in his testimony stated while

Versluis was running towards him swinging the belt, "I've
got a gun and I'm not fucking around/5 and fired a shot in

~ 3 -
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front of and to the left of Versluis and kept retreating
to the car.

Versluis paused and then charged Schoenfeld

as Schoenfeld was getting into the car through the passengedoor, which Guthrie had already opened.

Versluis came in

contact with Schoenfeld and grabbed the gun,

Two shots

were fired~-one entered Versluis1 chest and one his abdomen.

Guthrie swung the car around and accelerated out of

the parking lot.

Someone opened the driver's door and

grabbed Guthrie by the hair, a beer bottle was thrown
into the car through an open window, something struck the
car on the top causing dents immediately before the two
shots were heard.
When Versluis came away from the car, he staggered
several steps and collapsed.

At this time he had the

gun and the belt in his hands and was holding the gun by
the barrel.

Guthrie drove down 70th South looking for

Austin, who they didn f t find.
"I think I shot the dude."
the police."

Schoenfeld stated to Guthrie

Guthrie said "We better call

They proceeded to Guthrie!s apartment and

immediately called the police who arrived 30-45 minutes
later.
The testimony from the Medical Examiner combined with the stipulated testimony from FBI reports showing powder residue on the clothing over both entrance
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wounds indicate that each was a wound made with the gun >
in contact with the body of the deceased.
There is no evidence of any contact, either
physical or verbal, between Schoenfeld and Versluis until
the deceased was running towards Schoenfeld swinging a
belt a very few seconds before the shots which resulted
in Versluis1 death.
The jury, while deliberating, sent a written
question to Judge Croft which the Judge declined to answer.
After they (the jury) had returned with the verdict on the
lesser offense (negligent homicide), the Judge made the
following statement to the jury (see R 371-372):
11

1 would like to say to you also that
I appreciated your thoughtful question.
I always felt that once we submit a case
to the jury that the Judge shouldn!t give
further instruction or review any further
testimony, and I appreciate the fact that
the instructions we give you are given in
language that is legal enough that sometimes judges and lawyers don't always understand it, so I think it was a very thoughtful
question. Maybe in the future we can use
language more in lay terms. I don't know,
but in any event, thank you very much for
your service again, and now you are excused.
* * * * *

"Might be of interest to you (talking
to counsel in the court), they would like
to have explained to them in lay language
the difference between manslaughter and
negligent homicide." (R 372)
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POINTS ON APPEAL
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTION 14 IN
THAT (A) HE IMPROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY AS TO THE
LAW IN SUBSECTION (b) OF INSTRUCTION 14, AND (B) THE
COURT'S INSTRUCTION 14 IN EFFECT CONSTITUTES COMMENTS
ON THE EVIDENCE IN BOTH SUBPARAGRAPHS (b) AND (c),
The Court in Instruction 14 (R 53) r after properly defining justifiable homicide, went forward to set
forth exclusions to the rule, and in doing so, stated
at subparagraph (b);
"•..his attempting to commit, his
committing, or his fleeing after the
commission, or attempted commission
of a felony, and under the law it is
a felony if one uses ""a deadly weapon
in"threatening to do bodily injury to
another and accompanies tfTatT threat by
a show of immediate force or violence^'
(Emphasis added]
This is not a correct statement of the law, see
76-10-501, Utah Code Annotatedf as amended by the laws of
1973, defining dangerous weapon, including firearms, at
paragraph (2) of that statute.

76-10-506, Utah Code

Annotated, as amended by the laws of 1973, reads as follows :

- 6 -
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"Threatening with or using dangerous
weapon in fight or quarrel - Every person
except those persons described in Section
76-10-503 who, not in necessary self-defense,
in the presence of two or more persons
draws or exhibits any dangerous weapon
in an angry and threatening manner, or
unlawfully uses the same in any fight
or quarrel, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. "
Section 76-10-503, referred to in the quotation
above, affects only persons previously convicted of a
crime of violence, drug addicts, or people who have been
declared mentally incompetent, none of which apply to the
appellant herein.
The writer is fully aware of 76-5-103, Utah Code
Annotated, as amendedf which, combined under the proper
findings of fact with 76-5-102, could make appellant's
acts a felony of the third degree.

The Court, by adding

the underlined portion to the otherwise proper subparagraph of Instruction 14, invaded the province of the jury,
found the facts as he (the Court) saw it, and by doing so,
effectively said !,I have defined justifiable homicide for
you, but after reading subparagraph (b) of that Instruction, there is no way you can consider the question of
justifiable homicide.ff

This clearly violates the mandate

of 77-31-31, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.

- 7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The Court continued to err in invading the province of the jury in giving also in Instruction 14 a definition of "aggressor1* and then going on to state that r a
person can also be classified as an aggressor if he leaves
the scene of a quarrel, arms himself, and then returns to
the scene and renews the quarrel.r

It must be remembered

that there is no possible interpretation of the evidence
to show any contact with the deceased, either verbal or
physical, or any quarrel prior to approximately ten seconds before the shots which caused the fatality,

The

deceased was an interloper in a quarrel between appellant
and Dee Johnson which had already terminated prior to the
shooting*
The Court also in Instruction 14, in its last
paragraph, misstates the law.
These combinations of errors made it impossible
for the jury to consider the defense of justifiable homicide.
Counsel for the appellant took timely and proper
exception to the errors in Instruction 14 (R 368-369).
POINT II
THERE IS NO POSSIBLE INTERPRETATION OF THE EVIDENCE WHICH CAN JUSTIFY A FINDING OF NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE.

- 8 -
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UNDER ANY VIEW, ALL OF THE EVIDENCE OR ANY PORTION, THE
ACTS CAUSING THE DEATH HAD TO BE EITHER (A) WILLFUL, WHICH
WOULD CONSTITUTE MANSLAUGHTER, OR (B) ACCIDENTAL DISCHARGE
IN THE STRUGGLE FOR THE GUN, WHICH WOULD CONSTITUTE
EXCUSABLE HOMICIDE,
The jury apparently found itself on the horns
of a dilemma, after some hours of deliberation, of being
unable to reach a verdict of guilty on the charge of manslaughter and being unable to acquit on a basis of justifiable homicide in view of'the Court's Instruction 14, discussed in Point I above, and at that time, through the
bailiff in charge of them, sent a note to the Court with
a question indicating they would like to have explained
to them in lay language the difference between manslaughter
and negligent homicide, see Judge Croft's remark (R 372).
The Judge refused to further define or to give further
instructions (R 371-372)*

The complete reading of the

transcript indicates that there is no possible combination
of facts under the evidence which constitute negligent
homicide.

The acts of Schoenfeld, combined with the acts

of Versluis, which resulted in his death had to be either
willful—that is, intentional pulling of the trigger by
Schoenfeld, which would be under subsection (b) of Instruction 12 "causes the death of another under circumstances

-9 -
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where the actor

reasonably believes the circumstances

provide a moral or legal justification or extenuation of
his conduct, although the conduct is not legally justifiable or excusable under existing circumstances" or accidental in that the gun discharged twice through the combined efforts of Schoenfeld and Versluis in the struggle
for the gun, in which case the death would have been excusable and not as the result of criminal negligence as defined
by the Court in Instruction' 17 (R 61).
.

-

i

SUMMARY
A careful reading of all of the testimony can
leave one conclusion, and only one--that being that the
two questions (1) who was the aggressor (as between
Schoenfeld and Versluis, not between Schoenfeld and
Johnson, and (2) the question whether Schoenfeld1s acts
after drawing the gun were (a) justifiable as lawful
acts in defense of himself, or (b) unlawful acts amounting to a misdemeanor under 76-10-501 and 506, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as amended by the Laws of Utah 1975, or
(c) unlciwful acts amounting to a felony under 76-5-102-103,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended.

These were clearly

questions of fact for the jury.

- 10 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The Court, by its wording of Instruction 14,
subparagraphs (b) and (c)f (see Point I supra) , indicates
that the jury, if it follows the lawf canft consider the
defense of justifiable homicide although a justifiable
homicide instruction was given by adding the underlined
phrase in subparagraph (b) of said Instruction 14 "under
the law it is a felony if one uses a deadly weapon in
threatening to do bodily injury to another and accompanies
that threat by a show of immediate force or violence,"
(R 53).

Without giving instructions as to the possible

misdemeanor as set forth above or the possibility of a
lawful act as self-defense, thereby effectively removing
the appellant's justifiable homicide defense.
The Court compounds the jury's dilemma by defining aggressor and then adding (upon the requests of both
the State and the appellant) "a person can also be classified as an aggressor if he leaves the scene of a quarrel,
arms himself, and then returns to the scene and renews
the quarrel."

The Court does not instruct on the basis

of there being more than one quarrel.

In the evidence

before the jury there were as many as four "hassles"
involved—two up the canyon not involving either Schoenfeld
or Versluis—two more at the

Canyon Inn between Schoenfeld
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and Johnson, and another in which the deceased Versluis
knocked down both Austin and Guthrie when Schoenfeld had
left the scene with Johnson.
At the risk of being repetitious, I again state
that there had been no contact or relationship whatsoever
between Schoenfeld and Versluis.

In other words, there

had been no quarrel with Versluis to renew.
The Court, in adding the last paragraph, compounds the problem further and. makes it appear as a comment on the facts stating that Schoenfeld was the aggesssor
and in effect that Versluis had the right to go to any
lengths to disarm Schoenfeld and prevent his escape.

That

is not the law in this state since the new Code came into
effect July 1, 1973.
With regard to Point II, counsel for the State,
Mr.Hyde, joined counsel for the defense in his argument
that under the facts there was no basis for a finding of
negligent homicide.

It is apparent that the jury was

confused by the Courtfs instructions, as is pointed out
by their request for clarification of the difference
between manslaughter and negligent homicide.

The Court

denied them the aid requested, and apparently they had
been unable to find the elements of manslaughter, and
under Instruction 14, felt they could not find justifi-

- 12 -

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

r

able homicide and there compromised on the "lesser included
offense" which could not by any interpretation of the
evidence have been the crimef if any, committed.
It is respectfully submitted that the Court
reverse the verdict and judgment and remand the case to
the trial court for a new trial on the crime of negligent homicide.
Respectfully submitted,
HATCH, McRAE & RICHARDSON

Sumner J, Hatch
Attorneys for DefendantAppellant
370 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief to Mr.
Vernon B. Romney, Attorney General of Utah, Attorney for
Plaintiff-Respondent, Utah State Capitol, Salt Lake City,
UT 84114, postage prepaid.

/ A/
"Sumner J. Hatch
/
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